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 CRONY CAPITALISM: RIGHT HERE, RIGHT NOW 
JONATHAN R. MACEY* 
Crony capitalism describes an economic and political 
environment in which pursuing and obtaining government 
favors is both part of everyday life and a necessary protocol 
for succeeding in business. Where crony capitalism exists, 
notions of meritocracy have been displaced by notions of 
cronyism or kleptocracy or something similar. Crony 
capitalism has ebbed and flowed in our history, and it seems 
as though today it is on the rise.  
Just looking at late 2012 and early 2013, one could talk for 
hours about the examples of crony capitalism—for example, 
the $78 million tax write-off in the new tax bill for NASCAR 
drivers.1 That write-off may be very popular—I don’t know—
but it is crony capitalism. 
The tax benefits for the New York Liberty Zone provide 
another example.2 Yet another was the tax victory given to 
companies operating in American Samoa by Chris Dodd—a 
former Connecticut Senator—who now represents Hollywood’s 
movie studios. He got those companies a two-year extension on 
a provision allowing film and television producers to expense 
the first $15 million of production costs incurred in the United 
States—a kind of wholesale crony capitalism.3 
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There are also examples involving recent political appointees. 
The Senate confirmed Jack Lew as Secretary of the Treasury in 
February 2013,4 and one of the striking things about that 
appointment is that his contract at Citibank, where he did 
administrative work with a hedge fund, stipulated that he would 
receive a bonus if, and only if, he were appointed to a senior 
position in government.5 It now appears that not all bribery is 
illegal, because it appears that prospective bribery is okay. As 
long as you buy the futures contract that calls for paying a 
bureaucrat in the future, it is not the same thing as buying it on 
the spot market, where bribes are paid at around the same time 
the favors are granted. I think that permitting prospective 
payments to government regulators is not such a good idea. 
Mary Jo White provides another example. White is a very 
distinguished lawyer—a former partner in the law firm of 
Debevoise & Plimpton—who has now been confirmed as the 
Chairman of the SEC.6 While White was at Debevoise, one of 
her clients was the investment banking firm Morgan Stanley. In 
2005, Morgan Stanley’s board of directors decided to make a 
man named John Mack the CEO, but they encountered a 
problem. Reports suggested that Mack might have violated 
those pesky provisions in the federal securities regulation that 
outlawed insider trading.7 
White’s client, Morgan Stanley, called her.8 They said it would 
be embarrassing if they elected John Mack as CEO and he was 
sued for securities fraud the next day. So they asked White to 
find out whether he would be sued. White then called the head 
of the Enforcement Division of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Linda Chatman Thomsen, to ask how things 
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looked for Mr. Mack.9 Though there are at any given time 
hundreds of people begging for information about whether and 
when the SEC will finish investigations or reach a conclusion in 
a particular case, White got her answer.10 Mr. Mack ascended to 
the position of CEO of Morgan Stanley. Thomsen, incidentally, is 
no longer the head of the Enforcement Division of the SEC. She 
is now a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York.11 
In short, the United States has many examples of crony 
capitalism. It is clear that the supply and demand of crony 
capitalism is such that this sordid brand of capitalism is going 
to emerge and even dominate wherever the conditions are ripe 
for it. Crony capitalism involves a demand side—which is the 
demand of regulated institutions like Morgan Stanley or 
Goldman Sachs or whomever for legislative favors—and a 
supply that is provided by bureaucrats and elected officials. 
The main point is simply that as economic regulation increases 
and competition decreases, crony capitalism grows. It is not 
really a moral story because both our elected political officials 
and our business people operate in Darwinian environments in 
which not everybody survives, the process weeds out the 
weakest, and firms and legislators with better survival 
characteristics do better. This situation explains both the rise of 
crony capitalism and its periodic decline. 
Perhaps the biggest single instance of a decline in crony 
capitalism in the history of the United States took place toward 
the end of the nineteenth century. At that time, the States had 
none of the current rules for obtaining a corporate charter. It 
was, rather, the era of special charters.12 To get a corporate 
charter, a group of individuals had to go to its state legislature 
and get it to pass a special statute for the group to, say, put in 
this turnpike or build that bridge.13 This was, of course, a kind 
of fertilizer for cronyism, because people got these charters by 
paying bribes.14 People in the private sphere were faced with a 
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terrible choice of either doling out money to politicians or 
going out of business. It is universally acknowledged that these 
charters came with monopoly power and cost people a lot of 
money, from which the state legislators took a cut.15 
This is uncontroversial. What is interesting is that crony 
capitalism in the granting of corporate charters vanished 
completely over time.16 Economic conditions changed when 
states moved to a system of incorporation by right.17 As a 
result, individuals or groups can now go on the Internet and, 
for thirty-five or fifty dollars, form a corporation immediately 
in any state, including, most notably, Delaware.18 This change 
to incorporation by right started to decrease the demand for 
special charters. People stopped agreeing to pay very much for 
them.19 Courts began to allow people to obtain charters in one 
state and do business in another, under libertarian readings of 
the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Constitution.20 So if an individual or group went 
to one state legislature and it was unwilling to grant a charter, 
then the individual or group could go to another. The states 
had to compete among themselves.21 That competition drove 
down the price of corporate charters, and eventually it became 
value-maximizing for the states to enter into what we now 
know as a jurisdictional competition for corporate charters. In 
that way, a regulatory change decreased crony capitalism. 
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Other examples of competition overcoming cronyism are 
more familiar. In the old era of NCAA basketball, particularly 
in the Southeastern Conference, teams were all white. That 
ended when several basketball coaches, particularly one at 
Texas Western, realized that if they did not discriminate in 
picking a team, they would do pretty well.22 And when a mixed 
race Texas Western team finally beat an all-white University of 
Kentucky basketball team in the NCAA championships, these 
walls began finally to break down.23 
I personally observed a similar phenomenon when I was at a 
firm in Honolulu. As the firms were becoming more competitive, 
members of historically marginalized groups—Japanese and 
Filipino and other Asian names—percolated to the top. The same 
change happened in New York firms with Jewish names. 
So cronyism is like a biological growth: It will grow 
wherever environmental conditions enable it to do so. The only 
way to get rid of it is to create an environment where the 
payoffs from demanding or seeking special favors from 
politicians and bureaucrats are lower than the costs. In this 
environment there is no incentive for interest groups to 
demand such special favors.  
Creating an economy that is free of crony capitalism requires 
two things. The first is a very strong competitive environment 
in which cronyism is a luxury that competitors cannot afford. 
The second is a free market system that forces entrepreneurs 
and businesses to compete in the marketplace along the vectors 
of price, service, and quality rather than in the corridors of 
Gucci Gulch in Washington by engaging in cronyism. 
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